News Desk
Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), established in 1948, is one of the world’s most powerful and controversial intelligence agencies, often described as a state within a state. Its historical role in sponsoring terrorism, particularly in Kashmir and Afghanistan, has profoundly shaped South Asia’s security landscape, strained India-Pakistan relations, and drawn global scrutiny.
The ISI was created to coordinate intelligence among Pakistan’s army, navy, and air force following the 1947-48 Indo-Pak War over Kashmir. Initially focused on military intelligence, it expanded under General Ayub Khan’s regime (1958-1969), becoming a tool for domestic surveillance and external operations. The 1971 Indo-Pak War, which led to Bangladesh’s creation, marked a turning point, as the ISI shifted toward covert warfare to offset Pakistan’s conventional military inferiority to India.
The ISI’s global prominence surged during the Soviet-Afghan War (1979-1989), when it became the conduit for U.S. and Saudi funding to mujahideen fighters. With CIA support, the ISI trained and armed groups like Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hezb-e-Islami, laying the groundwork for its expertise in proxy warfare. However, the ISI’s agenda diverged from Western interests, as it funneled resources to Islamist factions aligned with Pakistan’s goal of securing a pro-Pakistan regime in Kabul. This era saw the ISI forge ties with figures like Osama bin Laden, whose al-Qaeda later turned against the West.
Post-Soviet withdrawal, the ISI redirected battle-hardened jihadists toward Kashmir, exploiting the 1989 insurgency against Indian rule. Groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), founded with ISI backing, targeted Indian security forces and civilians, aiming to “bleed India through a thousand cuts.” The ISI’s role in arming, training, and infiltrating militants across the Line of Control (LoC) is well-documented, with declassified Indian intelligence reports estimating that by the 1990s, the ISI ran over 100 training camps in Pakistan-administered Kashmir.
The ISI’s sponsorship of terrorism in Kashmir has been relentless, driven by Pakistan’s obsession with wresting the region from India. The 1999 Kargil War, orchestrated by then-army chief Pervez Musharraf, saw ISI-trained militants support Pakistani troops in infiltrating Indian territory, nearly sparking a full-scale war. The 2001 attack on India’s Parliament, traced to JeM, and the 2008 Mumbai attacks, executed by LeT, cemented the ISI’s reputation as a terror enabler. David Headley, a key Mumbai plotter, revealed during U.S. interrogations that ISI officers provided logistical support, a claim corroborated by India’s extradition of Tahawwur Rana in 2024.
The ISI’s strategy in Kashmir blends military, psychological, and communal tactics. It exploits local grievances, radicalizes youth through propaganda, and foments Hindu-Muslim tensions, as seen in the Pahalgam massacre of April 22. Indian officials allege the attack, initially claimed by The Resistance Front (a LeT offshoot), was ordered by ISI chief Lt. Gen. Nadeem Anjum to disrupt Jammu and Kashmir’s stability after successful elections. The targeting of Hindu tourists and a Kashmiri Muslim who intervened reflects the ISI’s cynical use of religious identity to sow discord, a tactic echoing the 2000 Chhatisinghpora massacre of Sikhs during President Bill Clinton’s India visit.
The ISI’s influence extends beyond Kashmir. In Afghanistan, it nurtured the Taliban, ensuring Pakistan’s “strategic depth” against India. After the U.S.-led invasion in 2001, the ISI sheltered Taliban leaders and facilitated their 2021 return to power. The ISI’s duplicity—posing as a U.S. ally while abetting insurgents—drew criticism from NATO commanders, with a 2011 report accusing it of directing attacks on coalition forces. The discovery of Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad, near an ISI facility, further exposed Pakistan’s double game, though the agency faced no significant repercussions.
The ISI operates through a vast network of proxies, front organizations, and sleeper cells, funded by state budgets, narcotics trafficking, and Gulf donations. It maintains plausible deniability by using non-state actors, allowing Pakistan’s civilian leadership to deflect blame. The agency’s reach extends to cyberattacks, as seen in alleged disruptions of Indian infrastructure, and disinformation campaigns to radicalize youth. Its collaboration with China, particularly through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, has bolstered its resources, though Beijing remains wary of Pakistan’s instability.
Globally, the ISI’s actions have isolated Pakistan. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) placed Pakistan on its gray list (2018-2022) for terror financing, a status India seeks to reinstate post-Pahalgam. Middle Eastern nations, once sympathetic, now view Pakistan with suspicion, aligning closer to India’s economic and diplomatic clout. The U.S., while reliant on Pakistan for Afghan operations, has shifted toward India, with President Trump’s 2025 condemnation of the Pahalgam attack signaling reduced tolerance for ISI antics.
The ISI’s dominance reflects Pakistan’s military-centric power structure. It manipulates civilian governments, orchestrates coups (e.g., Musharraf’s 1999 takeover), and shapes foreign policy. General Asim Munir, the army chief, wields significant influence over the ISI, using it to suppress domestic dissent, such as the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf protests, while projecting power abroad. The agency’s budget, estimated at $500 million annually (unofficial figures), dwarfs civilian oversight, enabling unchecked operations.
The ISI’s terror sponsorship has backfired domestically, with groups like the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) turning against the state. Balochistan’s insurgency, fueled by resentment over ISI repression, further strains Pakistan’s cohesion. Yet, the agency remains unrepentant, viewing terrorism as a cost-effective tool to counter India’s economic and military rise.
India has consistently exposed the ISI’s role, from sharing dossiers at the UN to securing convictions like Tahawur Rana’s. Post-Pahalgam, India’s suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty and border trade signals a strategy to economically choke Pakistan while rallying global support. Militarily, India’s Rafale jets, S-400 air defense systems, and cyber capabilities offer deterrence, though the ISI’s proxies exploit gaps in Kashmir’s security, as Pahalgam revealed.
The ISI’s historical role underscores its status as the architect of Pakistan’s reckless adventurism. By fueling terrorism, it has not only destabilized India but also pushed Pakistan toward economic ruin and international pariah status. For India, neutralizing the ISI demands a multipronged approach: intensifying counterterrorism operations, leveraging diplomacy to isolate Pakistan, and fostering Kashmir’s integration through development. As protests across Kashmir reject the Pahalgam bloodshed, the ISI’s divisive tactics appear to be losing ground, offering India a chance to cement its narrative of peace and resilience against Pakistan’s crumbling deep state.
