News Desk
Pakistan and Afghanistan under Taliban rule entered a new phase of open conflict in March 2026 after weeks of rising tension along the border. Pakistani airstrikes inside Afghan territory ended the fragile ceasefire that regional mediators brokered in October 2025. The escalation marks the most serious confrontation between the two sides since the Taliban returned to power in 2021.
Taliban officials launched coordinated attacks on Pakistani military positions in several eastern provinces, including Nangarhar, Nuristan, Kunar, Khost, and Paktika. Pakistan responded with a large military operation named Ghazab lil‑Haq, targeting Taliban positions and sites linked to Tehrik‑e‑Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Pakistan expanded the operation the next day with strikes in Kabul and Kandahar.
Afghanistan accused Pakistan of violating its sovereignty and causing civilian casualties. Pakistan rejected the accusation and stated that it targeted only TTP infrastructure. Islamabad refers to the TTP as Fitna al‑Khawarij, a term it uses to deny the group religious legitimacy.
The confrontation peaked on 16 March, when an airstrike on a rehabilitation centre caused mass casualties. Afghan authorities described the incident as one of the deadliest attacks in the country’s recent history. Both sides agreed to a short Eid truce from 18 to 23 March, but fighting resumed soon after.
The conflict is unfolding while global attention is focused on the war involving Iran and disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz. This shift has reduced the involvement of previous mediators. China has emerged as the only external actor with the access and capacity to engage both sides. India has avoided involvement due to concerns about provoking Pakistan. The United States is focused on its confrontation with Iran and views Islamabad as a potential diplomatic channel.
Pakistan appears to be using the global distraction to increase pressure on the Taliban. Islamabad aims to force Kabul to act against the TTP, which has expanded its presence in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The TTP has strengthened its capabilities with American equipment left behind after the 2021 U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan. The group’s manpower may reach 20,000 fighters, far higher than earlier UN estimates.
Pakistan’s internal economic crisis has also created conditions that support TTP recruitment. The past year recorded the highest number of militant attacks in Pakistan in a decade. Islamabad blames Kabul for providing sanctuary to the TTP. Kabul denies this and accuses Pakistan of sheltering ISIS‑K operatives who attack Afghan targets.
The dispute is further complicated by the unresolved status of the Durand Line, the 2,600‑kilometre border drawn in 1893. No Afghan government has formally recognised it. The Taliban government rejects the line as a colonial boundary that divides Pashtun communities.
Pakistan maintains a conventional military advantage, including nuclear capability, a large standing army, and advanced air power. The Taliban lacks air assets but increasingly uses drones and low‑cost unmanned systems to challenge Pakistan’s technological edge. The Taliban also relies on guerrilla tactics that complicate any large‑scale Pakistani ground operation.
The Taliban refuses to confront the TTP due to ethnic and ideological ties and fears that internal divisions could push fighters toward ISIS‑K. This dynamic limits Kabul’s willingness to meet Pakistan’s demands.
Analysts assess that a full conventional war is unlikely. Afghanistan lacks the economic and logistical capacity for a prolonged conflict. Pakistan faces severe domestic challenges and cannot sustain two active fronts, especially after its confrontation with India in 2025. Both sides therefore rely on controlled escalation to gain leverage without triggering a wider collapse.
The ongoing instability along the border provides space for transnational militant groups and increases regional security risks. For India, the situation offers both relief and danger. A distracted Pakistan reduces immediate pressure on India’s western border, but instability in Afghanistan threatens regional connectivity projects and increases the risk of militant radicalisation.
The conflict reflects a deeper strategic shift. Pakistan’s influence over the Taliban has weakened since 2021. Islamabad now faces an empowered TTP, a hostile Kabul, and a deteriorating security environment along a historically sensitive frontier.
