The Cook Islands’ decision to formalize a comprehensive strategic partnership with China is the latest signal of Beijing’s growing influence in the Pacific—a development that is likely to unsettle New Zealand, which maintains constitutional ties with the island nation.
Signed on February 15 in Harbin, China, by Cook Islands Prime Minister Mark Brown and Chinese Premier Li Qiang, the agreement marks a deeper alignment between the small island nation and the world’s second-largest economy. The deal covers cooperation in trade and investment, tourism, ocean science and aquaculture, agriculture and infrastructure, as well as climate resilience and disaster preparedness.
The strategic agreement has sparked unease in New Zealand, where officials were left uninformed about its details prior to its signing. Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Affairs Minister Winston Peters issued a carefully worded statement saying that New Zealand would examine the agreements “closely, in light of our interests and our mutual constitutional responsibilities.”
While the Cook Islands is a self-governing nation, it remains in “free association” with New Zealand, meaning that while it independently manages domestic affairs, New Zealand provides assistance in foreign policy, defense, and budgetary support.
Under the 2001 Joint Centenary Declaration, Wellington and Avarua are expected to consult regularly on defense and security matters. New Zealand’s expectation, therefore, is that it should have been informed about the deal’s details before it was signed.
Peters’ concerns were echoed by his spokesperson, who described the lack of consultation as “a matter of significant concern.” The full text of the agreements is yet to be released, and New Zealand officials are waiting for Prime Minister Brown to disclose the details upon his return from China.
One of the more sensitive aspects of Brown’s visit to China involves discussions about seabed minerals. Officials from the Cook Islands’ Seabed Minerals Authority engaged in talks with Chinese research institutes about “collaborative opportunities” in marine and deep-sea exploration technology.
The Cook Islands sits atop a wealth of deep-sea mineral resources, including polymetallic nodules rich in cobalt, nickel, and manganese—metals crucial for battery technology and clean energy transition.
While deep-sea mining remains a contentious issue internationally, China has positioned itself as a leader in the industry. New Zealand, which has been reassessing its own stance on deep-sea mining, is now confronted with the reality that Beijing is extending its reach into a region where it holds historic sway.
The Cook Islands is the latest in a series of Pacific nations strengthening ties with Beijing. Over the past few years, China has signed security and development agreements with countries such as the Solomon Islands and Kiribati, moves that have alarmed Western allies, including the United States and Australia.
For Beijing, the Pacific represents both strategic and economic opportunities. The region is home to vast marine resources, key shipping lanes, and potential military footholds. By deepening its engagement with small island nations, China is challenging the traditional influence of New Zealand and Australia, who have long seen themselves as the region’s primary security and development partners.
China’s engagement strategy in the Pacific typically involves infrastructure investments, concessional loans, and technical cooperation in areas such as marine science and climate resilience. In the case of the Cook Islands, Brown’s meetings with Chinese institutions also touched on trade and scientific collaboration, further solidifying Beijing’s presence.
New Zealand finds itself in a difficult position. It values its close relationship with the Cook Islands, where the population holds New Zealand citizenship, yet it cannot dictate the foreign policy choices of an independent nation. At the same time, Wellington is increasingly wary of China’s ambitions in the region, particularly in sectors that touch on security and resource extraction.
Peters emphasized that New Zealand “deeply values its unique relationship with the people of the Cook Islands” and highlighted that 2025 marks the 60th anniversary of free association between the two nations. But such diplomatic niceties do little to address the core issue: China’s footprint in the Pacific is expanding rapidly, and traditional powers like New Zealand are being left scrambling to respond.
As Brown returns from his visit to China, the full details of the strategic partnership remain unknown. What is clear, however, is that the geopolitical chessboard in the Pacific is shifting, and New Zealand may need to rethink its approach to maintaining influence in a region it has long considered part of its extended neighborhood.