News Desk
China’s growing influence in the Pacific is neither accidental nor unprecedented. The recent agreement between the Cook Islands and China on seabed mineral research is only the latest chapter in Beijing’s well-calibrated strategy of economic engagement, political maneuvering, and long-term relationship-building.
The lesson here is clear: nations that fail to recognize early warning signs often find themselves entangled in economic dependencies that translate into political leverage—a reality that played out in Sri Lanka, the Maldives, and now, perhaps, in the Cook Islands.
Larger neighbors like New Zealand, Australia, India, and the United States must not only pay attention but also recalibrate their approach before history repeats itself.
China’s approach is methodical. Unlike Western nations, which frequently attach governance conditions to their aid and loans, Beijing presents itself as a partner that does not interfere in domestic politics. This non-conditional engagement is particularly appealing to small island nations seeking immediate economic relief. However, the absence of strings on the surface does not mean the absence of influence.
China builds its presence by targeting key policymakers, offering economic incentives, and fostering relationships that facilitate agreements favorable to its strategic interests.
A case in point is the Maldives’ Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with China in 2017. The deal, negotiated with little transparency, was rushed through Parliament in under 10 minutes on the directive of then-President Abdulla Yameen. Lawmakers had no time to review its implications, yet it significantly expanded China’s economic foothold in the Maldives.
This playbook, securing agreements through personal networks and political leverage rather than public consensus, is a recurring pattern. The same was evident in Sri Lanka, where Chinese loans fueled ambitious infrastructure projects like the Hambantota Port under the Rajapaksa clan, leading to unsustainable debt and eventually forcing Colombo to lease the port to China for 99 years. When Colombo struggled to meet its repayment obligations, Beijing seized the opportunity, a stark example of debt-trap diplomacy.
Today, as the Cook Islands deepen their engagement with China, one cannot help but wonder whether a similar trajectory awaits.
China’s strategy is not exclusive to the Pacific. In Africa, Zambia and Djibouti have similarly found themselves in long-term dependencies due to unchecked Chinese investments. Djibouti now hosts China’s first overseas military base, an outcome that underscores how economic influence can evolve into strategic control. Meanwhile, Malaysia under Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad demonstrated that it is possible to renegotiate unfavorable Chinese-funded projects, offering a potential model for other small nations seeking engagement without excessive dependence.
Larger neighbors like India, New Zealand, Australia, and the United States have been slow to react to China’s encroachment in the Indo-Pacific. The signs are often subtle: a high frequency of visits by officials to Beijing, increased soft loans for infrastructure projects, and diplomatic language that signals alignment with Chinese interests. Once these elements are in place, reversing course becomes nearly impossible.
AidData, a research lab tracking global development finance, has shown that Chinese infrastructure investment often follows a pattern of influencing policymaking in recipient nations. A study of Chinese aid found that nations receiving large amounts of funding tend to vote in line with Beijing’s positions at the United Nations. This underscores how economic dependency gradually morphs into diplomatic alignment.
The Cook Islands’ engagement on seabed mineral exploration is particularly instructive. While framed as a research initiative, it aligns with Beijing’s broader ambitions to secure critical mineral supplies for its technological and defense industries. If left unchecked, these projects could lead to long-term economic arrangements that favor China’s strategic goals at the expense of local and regional interests.
In this context, it is crucial to acknowledge that smaller nations often rely on their larger neighbors for essential needs. The Cook Islands depend on New Zealand, much like Sri Lanka and the Maldives rely on India. Shouldn’t that be examined before resorting to a distant, donor-driven approach that prioritizes handouts over strategic alignment?
A prime example of this tension is the Maldives, which has grappled with its own strategic choices. Seabed exploration is an area of growing interest for Malé as well, with past controversies over cartography revenue, initially favoring India, leading to its cancellation by the new government. But when the Maldives prepares to open up this sector, the bigger question will be: will it align with India, or will it leave room for China to make inroads? Because once the door is open, China will find a way in.
The Indo-Pacific’s larger neighbors must rethink their engagement strategies. India, New Zealand, Australia, and the United States cannot counter China’s influence solely through security-driven initiatives or reactive diplomacy. Instead, they must offer a compelling alternative; one rooted in sustainable development, infrastructure funding that does not create debt traps, and partnerships that respect local governance structures. Constantly engaging at leadership, VIP, and mid-official levels is crucial to maintaining an open, two-way dialogue and ensuring that regional relationships remain dynamic and responsive.
One key shift would be adopting a proactive rather than a passive policy approach. This means:
To do so effectively, regional powers should focus on three key areas:
Early Engagement: Rather than waiting for agreements to be signed, regional powers should engage with nations at the first signs of Chinese courtship. Offering transparent, long-term development assistance can make Beijing’s offers less enticing.
Building Local Capacity: Many small nations turn to China out of necessity rather than preference. Training local policymakers, strengthening governance frameworks, and ensuring financial literacy in loan agreements could help nations avoid unfavorable deals.
Economic and Developmental Parity: Western nations must move beyond aid-as-charity and towards aid-as-partnership. Investments in climate resilience, blue economy initiatives, and technology-sharing can provide nations with alternatives to China’s infrastructure-heavy engagements.
Ultimately, reversing China’s influence will not be easy, but ignoring the warning signs will only deepen the imbalance. If the Cook Islands’ experience teaches anything, it is that Beijing’s strategy is persistent and opportunistic; and that nations wishing to counter it must be equally committed to providing credible alternatives before it is too late.
